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Conceptions of International Peace and
Environmental Rights: "The Remains of the Day"
BARBARA STARK*

But increasingly we are beginning to recognize a different commonage, a common heritage not in the earth's resources but in the
earth itself and in the global environment.... Might global danger

require a new conception of commonage, one that supports international regulation that is not only extraterritorial, one that cannot
wait on universal enlightenment to bring universal consent to what
may be essential?
Louis Henkin'
INTRODUCTION

The international legal system is reinventing itself in the aftermath
of the Cold War. 2 The United States is in the process of shaping a

* Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. LL.M.
1989, Columbia University; J.D. 1976, New York University; B.A. 1974, Cornell
University. I am deeply grateful to Fran Ansley, David Bederman, Mary Ellen
O'Connell, and Glenn Reynolds for very helpful criticism on very short notice; to
Grayfred Gray, Dean Rivkin, and Alan Thorndike for their valuable insights; and
to Mart Cizek for superb research assistance. I also acknowledge the generous
support of the American Council of Learned Societies, the American Philosophical
Society, and the Faculty Development Program of the University of Tennessee, and
the assistance of Rahul Kale of the United Nations Center for Human Rights (New
York) and Alexandre Tikhonov, Secretary of the United Nations Committee for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Geneva).
1. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions 216
RE cUI DES COURS 1, 348 (1989).
2. Symposium, After the Cold War: International Law in Transition, 32
INT'L L.J. 321 (1991). For an account of the collapse of the Soviet Union
HARv.
see Serge Schmemann, Declaring Death of Soviet Union, Russia and 2 Republics
Form New Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1991, at Al. For thoughtful
analyses, see Graham Allison & Robert Blackwill, America's Stake in the Soviet
Future, 70 FOREION Air., Summer 1991, at 77; Seweryn Bialer, The Death of Soviet
Communism, 70 FOREIGN AR., Winter 1991-1992, at 166. See generally ROBERT
CULLEN, TW.IOHT OF EMPIRE: INSIDE THE CRUMBLING SOVIET BLOc (1991); VLADisLAv
KRASNOV, RUSSIA BEYOND COMMUNISM (1991).

The end of the Cold War permitted the unprecedented coalition during the
Gulf War. See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of
War: "The Old Order Changeth,'" 85 AM. J. INT'L. L. 63 (1991); Alvin Z.
Rubinstein, New World Order or Hollow Victory?, 70 FOREIGN AFF., Fall 1991, at
53; Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L.
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new leadership role for itself in the emerging world order. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,3 in limbo since
it was signed by President Carter in 1977,4 was ratified in April
1992.1 In a similar breakthrough, the United States signed the Charter
of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, expressly affirming in an
international instrument that "every individual has the right ... to
6
enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights.'
Are we ready to renew and expand our commitment to international human rights? 7 Will we focus instead on the role of "world
policeman," working with and through the United Nations to main-

tain peace, or at least to contain conflict? s We might even try to

452 (1991); Symposium, The Iraqi Crisis: Legal and Socio-Economic Dimensions,
15 S.ILL. U. L.J. 411 (1991).
A separate development, the economic unification of Europe, also has implications for the international system. See, e.g., Council Directive 88/361 of 24 June
1988 for the Implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty, 1988 O.J. (L 178) 5 (Free
Movement of Capital Directive); Council Decision 88/591, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 1
(establishing a court of First Instance of the European Communities); John T. Lang,
The Development of European Community ConstitutionalLaw, 25 INT'L LAW. 455
(1991); Alan Riding, Europeans Agree on a Pact Forging New Political Ties and
Integrating Economies, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 11, 1991, at Al. See generally, JOHN
PINDER, EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY: THE BunDI~o OF A UNION (1991); ALPo M. Rusi,
AFTER THE COLD WAR: EUROPE'S NEW PoIrnCAL ARcHITEcTURE (1991); RENt
ScnwoK, U.S.-EC RELATIONS IN THE POST CoLD WAR ERA (1991); Gregory F.

Treverton, The New Europe, 71 FOREIGN APE., America and the World 1991-1992,
at 94.
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); see infra notes
54, 58-61 and accompanying text.
4. President Carter Signs Covenants on Human Rights, 77 DEP'T ST. BULL.
587 (1977).
5. 138 CONG. REC. S4781-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992)(Senate Executive
Session on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
6.. Charter of Paris for A New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190. As
Professor Damrosch observed, instruments like the United Nations Charter are
generally considered "political" rather than "legal" undertakings. Lori Fisler Damrosch, InternationalHuman Rights Law in Soviet and American Courts, 100 YALE
L.J. 2315, 2319 (1991).
7. See Jimmy Carter, Keynote: The United States and the Advancement of
Human Rights Around the World, 40 EMoRY L.J. 723 (1991); cf. Brenda Cossman,

Reform, Revolution or Retrenchment? InternationalHuman Rights in the Post-Cold
War Era, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 339 (1991)(considering possibility of renewed commitment to human rights on the international level).
Such a commitment necessarily implies an endorsement of the values which
shape international human rights, particularly a deep respect for "human dignity."
For a comprehensive and richly contextualized description of human dignity, see
MYREs S. McDoUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHrs AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 367-449
(1980).
8. See generally Symposium, The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era,
20 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (1991); Louis Henkin, Law and Wzr After the
Cold War, 15 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 147 (1991); Nicholas Rostow, The
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pull up the drawbridge. It may be argued that our own survival-or
at least our own standard of living 9-is too much at risk to take on
global problems, especially the overwhelming social and economic
problems of the Third World.
There are difficult choices to be made and the absence of a clear
consensus begs for fresh perspectives. As the United States considers
the awesome responsibilities of world leadership, we would do well
to ask ourselves where it is we hope to lead-what kind of world
and what kind of future do we want for ourselves and for our
children? It is time to reflect, to question, and to rigorously examine
the normative underpinnings of the international system.' 0
After World War II, the world powers signed the United Nations
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The two
stand as an unequivocal denunciation of the atrocities of the wara resounding, "Never again!" Never again would the world permit
such a war; never again such violations of human rights. Peace and
human rights are at the very foundation of modern international
law.
The historical linkage between human rights and peace is obvious,
but the conceptual as well as the practical linkage between them
remains unclear." This Article is a preliminary exploration of the

International Use of Force After the Cold War, 32 HARv.

INT'L L.J. 411 (1991).
Some commentators have argued that this might include intervention to support
struggling democracies. For concise summaries of those arguments, and their refutations, by the leading international scholars in the field, see LAW AND FORCE IN
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 111-223 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer
eds., 1991).
9. See Alan Tonelson, What is the National Interest?, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1991, at 35, 37 ("Internationalism ...
has led directly to the
primacy of foreign policy in American life and to the consequent neglect of domestic

problems ....
).
10. See Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for a New
Global Order, 22 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 601, 603 (1990). Franck compares this

post-Cold War moment to 1787, when, as Professor David Richards observed, a
'sense of challenge and opportunity fired the founders to initiate with the American
people a great collective democratic deliberation on constitutionalism. . .

.'

Such a

great collective democratic deliberation should now be going on in the world." Id.
at 603 (quoting DAvm A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 20 (1989)). Similarly, Mark Janis has stated, "Now is the time to . . . modify
[international law's] contemporary conceptions, both in its basic theory and in its
practice." Mark W. Janis, InternationalLaw?, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 363, 364 (1991).
11. As Professor Sohn pointed out, "It is an axiom that there is a connection
between [them], but it has not been investigated in depth." Letter from Louis B.
Sohn, Professor of Law, University of Georgia (Jan. 8, 1991) (on file with the
author). The linkage is often noted in passing. As Professor Schachter recently
observed, for example, "economic and social deficiencies ...

contribute to internal

tensions and to interstate conflict." Schachter, supra note 2, at 473.
Efforts to understand this relationship may be increasing. See, e.g., Jimmy
Carter, The Greatest Human Rights Crime: War, 13 HAMLINE L. REv. 469 (1990).
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relationship between our conceptions of peace and human rights,
using environmental rights 2 as a case study. My basic thesis is that
there is a fundamental tension between "peace" and "human rights"a tension deriving less from any inherent normative conflict than
from their respective (and complementary) spheres of influence in
the political world. Since "peace" addresses the conduct of states in
their external relations with other states, it is necessarily governed
by universal standards, i.e., standards established and shared by all
sovereign states. Human rights law, 3 in contrast, focuses on. the
conduct of states towards their own people. Although human rights
norms are framed in terms of universal standards, domestic
enforce4
ment is shaped by local culture and circumstances.

For discussions of "humanitarian intervention," or the use of force to protect
human rights, see, for example, FERNANO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988); Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of
Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 Am. J. INT'L. L. 516 (1990); Lori
Fisler Damrosch, Commentary on Collective Military Intervention to Enforce Human
Rights, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 8, at
215; Tom J. Faer, An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention,

in

LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER,

supra

note

8,

at

185;

Vladimir Kartashkin, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND
FORCE IN TH NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER, supra note 8, at 202; James A.R.
Nafziger, Self-determination and Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of
Power, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 9 (1991). For some preliminary thoughts on
the linkage between economic rights and peace, see Barbara Stark, Nurturing Rights:
An Essay on Women, Peace, and International Human Rights, 13 MICH. J. INT'L.
L. 144 (1991).
Professors MacDougal and Chen and the late Professor Lasswell have argued
in a vast body of work that these conceptions are necessarily intertwined, both with
each other and with other constituent dimensions of "world order." See, e.g.,
McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 7.
Some international instruments explicitly establish a linkage. The 1977 Protocols
to the Geneva Convention, for example, prohibit "methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment." Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art. 35, U.N.T.S. 3, 21 (entered into
force Dec. 7, 1978).
For a graphic account of the impact of the Persian Gulf War on the environment, see Nicholas A. Robinson, International Law and the Destruction of Nature
in the Gulf War, 21 ENT. POL'Y & L. 216 (1991).
12. Environmental rights often have been referred to as "third generation"
human rights. In the now classic formulation, "first generation" civil and political
rights correspond to the French Revolution's "libert6," "second generation" economic and social rights correspond to "6galit6," and "third generation" collective
rights to "fraternit6" or "solidaritt." Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights:
A New Generation for the 1980s?, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 435, 441 (1981).
13. As used in this Article, "human rights" refers to the familiar civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights set forth in the International Bill of
Rights. See infra notes 54-55 and text accompanying notes 50-72.
14. I am not suggesting that domestic adulteration is acceptable practice
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Environmental rights partake of both regimes, although the case
for considering them "human rights"' 5 is probably stronger. Like
other human rights, environmental rights have been tailored to local
conditions and require intrastate enforcement. Like peace, however,
environmental rights demand agreed upon norms and effective interstate implementation. To be fully realized, environmental rights require not only considerable coordination, but fundamental coherence
between the interstate and intrastate regimes, a coordination and a
16
coherence that has never before been achieved or even attempted.
This Article compares the pressures that have produced international regimes dealing with peace, human rights in general, and
environmental rights in particular. It also considers the concessions
each regime has had to make to state sovereignty. 7 Why have

under the human rights treaties. Many of the states that are parties to those treaties
file reservations to the "universal standards" or objections to the reservations of
other states. See, e.g., infra notes 127-28. Nor is there scholarly agreement as to
the range of permissible variation. See generally Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism
and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984)(considering competing
claims of relativism and universalism); Alison D. Renteln, The Unanswered Challenge
of Relativism and the Consequences for Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 514
(1985)(pointing out common assumptions and pitfalls of universalism). As a practical
matter, however, it is generally recognized that states are loathe to judge others,
lest they be judged. See infra note 74.
In Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (BeIg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5), the International Court of Justice noted that "all States ...
have a legal interest in [the protection of] ...the basic rights of the human person,
including protection from slavery and racial discrimination" and held that all states
accordingly could bring a claim when "obligations erga omnes" were violated. To
date, however, no state has sought to rely on Barcelona Traction for this principle.

Louis HENKIN ET
1987) [hereinafter

AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 531
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW]; see also infra

n.2 (2d ed.

note 33.
15, For a brief history of efforts to establish environmental rights as human
rights, see Melissa Thorme, Establishing Environment As a Human Right, 19 DENy.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 301, 303-05 (1991); see also infra text accompanying notes 11012 (discussing human rights and the environment); cf. infra text accompanying notes
94-95 (discussing environment as a security issue).
16. Whether peace and other human rights similarly require such coordination
and coherence to be fully realized is a more profound question that is beyond the
scope of this Article.
As Sir Geoffrey Palmer hopefully observed, "The extraordinary changes in
world order that have recently taken place must surely increase the chances of
achieving change in the methods of making international environmental law."
Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J.
INT'L.

L. 259, 259 (1992).

17. As the International Court of Justice pointed out in Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27), "the whole of
international law rests [on the fundamental principle of state sovereignty]." See
generally Walter F. Mondale, Human Rights and the Environment: Facing a New
World Order, 16 VT. L. REV. 449 (1992).
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sovereign states, often at considerable risk and expense, pledged to
promote peace, human rights, and environmental rights? What explains the sustained commitment to norms once dismissed as hortatory and now recognized as enforceable'8 law?' 9 Equally important,
what are the concessions, or accommodations, to state interests that
have been necessary to achieve this consensus? My purpose here is
not to undertake a comprehensive study, but to provide the general
reader with both a conceptual overview of these three distinct but

18. Those skeptics who still doubt the "enforceability" of international law
might recall Louis Henkin's oft-quoted observation that "almost all nations observe
almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost
all of the time." Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979)(emphasis
omitted). In addition to the "horizontal sanctions" arising from a shared and
fundamental, albeit imperfect, respect for international law, enforcement may be
obtained through the International Court of Justice. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The
Prospectsfor Enforcing Monetary Judgments of the InternationalCourt of Justice:
A Study of Nicaragua'sJudgment Against the United States, 30 VA. J. INT'L L.
891 (1990). But see Jonathan I. Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional

Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-Participationand Non-

Performance, in THE

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS

288, 293-

97 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1987)(citing cases showing decline in states' willingness
to accept the authority of the court). The United Nations Security Council also
enforces international law. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 44th Sess., 2981st
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991). For conceptual descriptions of "enforcers" in
international law and their limitations, see W. Michael Reisman, Sanctions and
Enforcement, in MYREs S. McDOUGAL & W. MICHAEL REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW ESSAYS 381, 413-20 (1981).
It is generally recognized that domestic courts remain the most important
enforcers of international law. See infra note 88. For an overview of the ways in
which human rights law has already affected domestic jurisprudence, see Kathryn

Burke et al., Application of InternationalHuman Rights Law in State and Federal
Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291 (1983). Some commentators have suggested future
possibilities for domestic enforcement of international human rights law. See, e.g.,

Farooq Hassan, The Doctrine of Incorporation:New Vistas for the Enforcement of
International Human Rights?, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 68, 69 (1983)(suggesting that the
Tenth Circuit's reliance on international norms in Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981), "usher[ed] in new vistas for the domestic protection
of internationally recognized human rights" through incorporation into federal

common law); Alan Brudner, The Domestic Enforcement of InternationalCovenants
on Human Rights: A Theoretical Framework, 35 U. TORONTO L.J. 219, 233 (1985).

But see Linda Greenhouse, High Court Backs Seizing Foreigner for Trial in U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1992, at Al (Mexican citizen, kidnapped by the United States
government in what Justice Stevens characterizes as "a flagrant violation of international law," may nonetheless be tried in the United States) (quoting United States
v. Alvarez-Machan, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2203 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
19. This development is often discussed in terms of a progression from
"soft" to "hard" law. Adherence to various hortatory declarations has historically
been obtained through such a process. The Treaty on Principles Governing States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205, for example, originated in "soft" accession to general principles. See

generally, C.M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 INT'L & Com3I. L.Q. 850 (1989).
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related regimes and an analytic framework in which to compare
them. I conclude that we must recognize and transcend the limitations
of the peace and human rights regimes if we are to develop effective
international environmental law.
I.

A.

PEACE 20

Impetus for Acceptance

The prohibition of the use of force in the United Nations Charter
represents a substantial limitation on traditional conceptions of state
sovereignty. International law has historically been understood as the
law of nation states-the rules agreed upon by the nations of the
world to govern their dealings with one another. Under international
law each state is recognized as autonomous and sovereign; none is
subject to the authority of another. The only recognized limitations
on state sovereignty were those to which the state itself acquiesced,
either explicitly in a treaty or through consistent custom.
Historically, waging war was a sovereign prerogative. 2' It might
be disapproved, it might have tremendous political costs, but it was

20. For present purposes, "peace" may be understood as it is used in the
Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace, G.A. Res. 11, U.N. GAOR, 39th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 22, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), which provides in pertinent
part that the right to peace "demands that the policies of States be directed towards
the elimination of the threat of war, particularly nuclear war, the renunciation of
the use of force in international relations and the settlement of international disputes
by peaceful means on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations." Article I of
the United Nations Charter provides that the purposes of the United Nations include:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity
with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement
of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
This definition is concededly rather arid and legalistic. For those craving more
philosophical treatments, see, for example, HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CoNmiTION (1958); NiccOLO MACHIAVELLI, TIE DISCOURSES (Max Lerner ed., 1950); THE
REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1968).
21. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 14-50 (1981).
For a description of "just war" prior to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, see
MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 539-41 (1986). War could be-and wasdeclared to seize territory, to redress an insult, for the glory of God, or merely on
a whim. See generally FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES
(1975); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS (1977).
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not generally considered illegal under international law until the
Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928.22 Even with the recognition of a legal
prohibition against war, it was another twenty years before legal
structures or mechanisms for averting war were devised. 23 It took the
devastation of World War II to convince the world powers that
limits had to be imposed for the security, even the survival, of all
states in a nuclear age. "Determined to save succeeding generations
from the scourge of war, Which twice in our lifetime has brought
untold sorrow to mankind," ' nation states banded together to prohibit the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. "25 The United
Nations Charter represented a significant concession on the part of
sovereign states. It also represented their collective acknowledgement
of a preemptive common objective-mutual survival. The urge to
punish a competitive neighbor, to seize particularly attractive territory, or even to protect the state from a real political or economic
threat was not worth the risk of annihilation. As Professor Henkin
has explained, "Peace was the paramount value .... Peace was more
26
important than progress and more important than justice."
B.

Concessions to State Sovereignty

While the United Nations Charter's prohibition on the use of
force represents a major restraint on hitherto unfettered sovereign

22. General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat.
2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
Article I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of
all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may
be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific

means.
Id. at 2345-46, 94 L.N.T.S. at 63.
23. The Covenant of the League of Nations provided for resort to "pacific
settlement" before going to war. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 12-16.

While this scheme was intended to deter war, it did not purport to enforce a legal
prohibition against it: "War, as such, was not made illegal but only where begun
without complying with the requirement." HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 14 at 668-70 (quoting D.W. BOWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 15-16 (1963)).
24. U.N. ChARTER pmbl.
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.

26.
AL.,

Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in Louis

RiT v.

MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE

HENKIN ET

37, 38-39 (1989).
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states, two important limitations make this prohibition acceptable.
First, carefully crafted exceptions permit the state to use force if
necessary for its own self-defense or at the request of a friendly state
which has been attacked ("collective self-defense"). 27 Thus, the use
of force in response to a prior unlawful use of force is permitted
under the Charter. 2
Second, and equally important, the prohibition only applies to
the interstate use of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter by its terms
only restricts armed conflict between different sovereign states. 29 Civil
wars, 30 even the harshest suppression of domestic insurgents or minority populations, are regarded more as internal matters than as
appropriate subjects of international intervention. 3' Sovereign states
retain their right to use force internally to protect themselves against
"domestic" threats to their own security. The notable exception, of
course, is that states cannot use force if in doing so they violate
human rights. 32 The international community, however, remains reluctant to intervene in-or even criticize-another state's "internal
policies."

27.
28.

33

U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW,

§ 905 (1987) (Uni-

lateral Remedies); see also David R. Penna, The Right to Self-Defense in the PostCold War Era: The Role of the United Nations, 20 DENV. J. INT'L" L. & POL'Y 41
(1991).
29. See also Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention into the
Domestic Affairs of States, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No.
14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
30. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on UN Intervention in
Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903 (1992); Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use
Armed Force, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1620, 1641-45 (1984).
31. See Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under InternationalLaw: A
Gross Violation, 29 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1991); Damrosch, supra note
11; Kartashkin, supra note 11; Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United

States Action in Panama, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1991).
32. The Security Council is considering appropriate limits on the right to use
force internally in the case of Yugoslavia. See O'Connell, supra note 30, at 909-12.
The United Nations recently adopted trade sanctions against Yugoslavia in an effort
to promote peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Paul Lewis, U.N. Votes 13-0 for

Embargo on Trade with Yugoslavia; Air Travel and Oil Curbed, N.Y. TIMEs, May
31, 1992, § 1, at 1; Excerpts From U.N. Resolution: "Deny Permission," N.Y.
TIMEs, May 31, 1992 § 1, at 8.

33. [Some argue that] one State should be free to invade another country
to prevent a holocaust or to depose a genocidal regime. That argument is
seductive but specious.. . . In fact, no State has pressed for exception to
the law of the Charter that would permit invading another country to
remedy even the grossest of human rights violations. In fact, no State has
gone to war against another State for the purpose of ending human rights

violations.
Henkin, supra note 8, at 156.
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Compliance

The international peacekeeping regime focuses on the acts of
states, that is, acts of aggression by one state against another.3 4 While
acts of individuals may well have an impact on peace, they neither
trigger sanctions nor justify the use of force by the target state,
unless they can be positively attributed to a state." Terrorism, for16
example, has been discouraged in a series of multilateral treaties,
but it generally37does not give the target state the right to use force
in self-defense.
How does the international system deal with violating states? 38
Article 51 self-defense, described above, 39 is basically an interim
measure under the United Nations Charter scheme. A state may
utilize self-defense "until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security."'' Under
Article 41, the Security Council has a broad range of options,
including resolutions of condemnation, economic sanctions, "complete or partial interruption of economic relations and . .. communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations." '4' Moreover, the
Security Council "may take such action by air, sea, or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security," including the use of force, should it decide that Article 41
' 42
measures "would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate.
It remains an open question whether Security Council action4 3preempts
further independent action by the target state or its allies.

34.

Definition of Aggression Resolution art. 1, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR,

29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).

35. Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 17, at 354-63.
36. .See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 (Hague Convention); Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23,

1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (Montreal Convention).
37. A state may be held accountable for terrorist acts under norms governing
state responsibility if the state subsidized, supported, or otherwise affirmatively
encouraged terrorists. Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility
for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 217,
307-09 (1977); cf. Geoffrey M. Levitt, Intervention to Combat Terrorism and Drug
Trafficking, in

LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER,

supra note 8,

at 224, 227 (the United States bombing of Libya was carefully justified by focusing
on "a pattern of incidents which, taken as a whole, amounts to an ongoing armed
aggression" likely to continue absent "preemptive" action by the United States).
38. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
39.

40.

See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.

U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (emphasis added).
U.N. CHARTER art. 41.
U.N. CHARTER art. 42.
43. Henkin would leave this to the Security Council. Henkin, supra note 8,
at 161. There is also the question of the extent of Security Council authority over
41.
42.
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The Article 43 regime, calling for "special agreements" under
which member states would provide armed forces for international
security, has never been implemented because of the stalemate in the
Security Council during the Cold War." While the scope and usefulness of the Article 43 regime remains to be proved, two points
are critical for present purposes. First, the Charter's peacekeeping
regime contemplates an international, collective response to the use
of force. Second, until and unless the member states commit substantial resources to Article 43 forces45 -or an alternative is devised
and adopted-international peacekeeping is structured more to respond to actual acts of aggression than to defuse simmering hostilities
and prevent their outbreak.
While some commentators have argued that the prohibition against
the use of force has been selectively enforced, on one has claimed
that it is a variable norm. This is not to say that the use of force is
unambiguous under the Charter. Louis Henkin takes the position
that there may be absolutely no transboundary use of force except
in the case of self-defense against armed attack.6 Oscar Schachter
has explained that
the use of force under Article 2(4) must be
"proportional." 47 And Anthony D'Amato has argued that under the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, the limits on the legitimate
use of force are even more liberal than those accepted in the Persian
Gulf War." All of these authors, however, like most international
member states. During the Persian Gulf War, commentators noted that Security
Council Resolution 678 imposed no legal obligation on the United States to use
armed force. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of
the United Nations Charter, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74 (1991). See generally S.C. Res.
678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., Resolutions and Decisions of 1990 at 27, U.N. Doc.
S/INF/46 (1991).
44. But see Uniting for Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377A, U.N. GAOR,
5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1951)(urging the Security Council
to promote the formation of special agreements under Article 43). This resolution
was passed during the Korean War and is usually considered an exceptional case.
For a concise summary, see DAVID J. SCHEFFER, UNITED NATIONS Ass'N OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

THE

UNiTED NATIONS IN THE GULF CRISIS AND OPTIONS

U.S. POLICY 8 (Occasional Papers 1991).
Franck and Patel say that the lack of Article 43 military forces does not matter.
Franck & Patel, supra note 2, at 66. Many other scholars disagree. See, e.g.,
Glennon, supra note 40.
45. For a recent assessment, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcing the ProFOR

hibition on the Use of Force: The U.N. 's Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait,
15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 482-84 (1991).
46. Henkin, supra note 26, at 37, 44-45.

47.

Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force,

53 U. Cm. L. REv. 113, 120 (1986). For an updated analysis, see O'Connell, supra
note 45, at 481-86.
48. Anthony D'Amato, Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 201, 202

(1991)(reviewing HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE (1989)); see also Tes6n, supra note 11; D'Amato, Invasion of Panama,
supra note 11.
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scholars who analyze the use of force, seek to articulate a standard
to be applied universally, in all situations. 49 All states, obviously,
have an interest in a clear standard, fairly applied.

II.
A.

HUMAN

RIGHTS

Impetus for Acceptance

Just as the United Nations Charter's restrictions on the use of
force limit a state's options in its dealings with other states, the
growing body of international human rights law restricts a state's
options in its dealings with its own people.50 A series of international
instruments requires states to respect and protect what the Charter
refers to as "the dignity and worth of the human person." 51 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights5 2 fleshes out this concept,53
establishing the framework for the "International Bill of Rights."
This consists of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights54 (Political Covenant or ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights5 5 (Economic Covenant
or ICESCR).
49. For a summary of the impact of United Nations peacekeeping from 19451984, see Eric Stein, The United Nations and the Enforcement of Peace, 10 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 304, 314 (1989) (quoting Ernst B. Haas, The Collective Management of
InternationalConflict, 1945-1984, in U.N. INST. FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH, THE
UNITED NATIONS AND TIRE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

at 3, 19, U.N. Sales No. E.87.III.K.ST/20 (1987)).
50. See generally Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The
Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117 (1991); Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual
Thinking About the Individual in InternationalLaw, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 11
(1978). The restrictions may also limit a state's options in its dealings with foreign
nationals and refugees, i.e., stateless people. See Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate
of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and Refugees Under International Human Rights
Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335 (1991).
51. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.; see also JAmEs W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 51-52 (1987)(arguing that "minimally good lives" should be the
focus of human rights).
52. G.A. Res. 217(A) (1948). The Universal Declaration "is not in terms a
treaty instrument." Secretary-General, 1971 Survey of InternationalLaw, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 4/425, at 196.
53. See Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 16-18 (1990).
54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)[hereinafter
Political Covenant]; see also THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
55. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signatureDec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976)[hereinafter
Economic Covenant]. A group of distinguished experts in international law met in
Maastricht, the Netherlands in 1986. See The Limburg Principleson the Implementation of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex, reprinted in 9 Hum. RTS. Q. 121, 122 (1987). The
group agreed unanimously that these principles "reflect[ed] the present state of
international law" unless specifically qualified as a "recommendation." Id. at 121.
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ICCPR addresses "first generation" civil and political rights,
what Philip Alston aptly called "rights to freedom.1 5 6 These rights
are most like the negative rights familiar to those of us in the United
States from our own Constitution. 7 Negative rights forbid a state
from interfering with its peoples' freedoms of "thought, conscience
and religion," ' "expression," 5 9 and "liberty and security,"w6 and
from denying equal protection of the law. 6' Although the United
States did not ratify the Political Covenant until 1992,62 the nation's
pervasive influence and the persistent appeal of its Constitution
played an important part in familiarizing the rest of the world with
63
these rights.
"Second generation" economic and social rights are set out in
the Economic Covenant. Like ICCPR, the Economic Covenant is
64
predicated on the "dignity and worth of the human person."
ICESCR recognizes that civil and political rights cannot be realized
unless basic human needs are met. 65 Economic rights were a major
concern for the former colonial Third World states who joined the
United Nations in the 1960s. Article 11.1 of ICESCR, for example,
provides in pertinent part: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing
and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living condi-

56. Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive
Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INT'L
L. REv. 307, 310 (1982).
57. See, e.g., HURST HANNUM & RICHARD B. LILLICH, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985); Richard B. Lillich,
The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851 (1989);
Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum, Linkages Between International Human Rights
and U.S. Constitutional Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 158 (1985).
58. Political Covenant, supra note 54, art. 18, para. 1.
59. Id. art. 19, para. 2.
60. Id. art. 9, para. 1.
61. Id. art. 16.
62. See supra note 5.

63.

See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United

States Constitution as a Charter of Human Rights, 15 NOVA L. REv. 1 (1991). See

generally authorities cited supra note 57.
64.
65.

Economic Covenant, supra note 55, pmbl.
See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 6th Sess., 358th-372d, 411th-417th mtgs.,

at 67-150, 399-499, U.N. Docs. A/C.3/SR.358-.372, .411-.417 (1951-1952)(general
debates on draft international covenant on human rights). The decisions resulting
from these debates are contained in the Report of the Third Committee, U.N.
GAOR, 6th Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item 29, at 37, U.N. Doc. A/2112 (1952), and
are discussed by David M. Trubeck, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the
Third World, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
205, 211 n.17 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984). See generally Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Need for
an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 365 (1990).
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tions. '" 6 Under Article 12.1, the parties recognize "the right of
of the highest attainable standard of
everyone to the enjoyment 67
physical and mental health."

Both covenants have been ratified by a substantial majority of
the United Nations member states, including virtually all of the
Western states and Japan.6 The "conventional wisdom" is that two
separate covenants were drafted "because of the East-West split and
a disagreement over the value of socio-economic rights. '"69 Some
commentators attribute the division more to the differences in "the
nature of the legal obligations and the systems of supervision that
could be imposed. '70 Economic rights, which might require significant
state expenditures, were to be achieved "progressively," while civil
and political rights, which depended more on state restraint, were to
be implemented immediately. 7' The interdependence of the two covenants, and the fallacy of asserting the superiority of either, are now
well-established.72

B.

Concessions to State Sovereignty

States give up some of their sovereignty by adhering to the
covenants, although the extent of that relinquishment varies. 73 Two
66.
67.

Economic Covenant, supra note 55, art. 11, para. 1.
Id. art. 12, para. 1.
See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL

LAW:
68.
SELECTED DocuMENTs 357 n.*, 376 n.* (1989)(listing states which have ratified the
ICCPR and the ICESCR).
69. David P. Forsythe, Book Review, 8 HuM. RTs. Q. 540, 541 (1986)(reviewing
A. GLENN MOWER, JR., INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE: GLOBAL
AND REGIONAL PROTECTION OF ECONomIc/SocIAL RIGHTS (1985)).
70. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 666 n. I (4th

ed. 1991).
71. Trubeck, supra note 65, at 205-33.

72. See Resolution on the Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic,
Social, Cultural, Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 130, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, at 209, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989)(accepted Dec. 15, 1989); Melanie

Beth Oliviero, Human Needs and Human Rights: Which Are More Fundamental?,
40 EMORY L.J. 911 (1991); Michael W. Giles, Comments on Oliviero Article, 40
EMORY L.J. 939. See generally, Russell L. Barsh, Current Development, A Special

Session of the UN General Assembly Rethinks the Economic Rights and Duties of
States, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 192, 199 (1991)(noting recent "linkage of human rights
with the conditions for capitalism").
For a discussion of the limits of the positive-negative dichotomy in the context
of ICESCR, see Philip Alston & Gerard Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States
Parties' Obligations Under InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 9 HuM. RTS. Q. 156, 159-60 (1987).
73. Sweden, for example, incurred no further obligations by ratifying ICESCR:
Prior to ratification . .. pertinent Swedish legislation had been submitted

to a careful review in order to ascertain to what extent it was in conformity
with the [Economic) Covenant. No major adjustments had then been
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,important caveats preserve enough state autonomy to make this
palatable. First, except for a handful of peremptory norms, there is
little risk of interstate enforcement or even censure of human rights
violations.
Peremptory norms, or jus cogens, are norms "accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole as
[norms] from which no derogation is permitted." ' 5 These norms
include prohibitions against genocide, torture, racial discrimination,
and apartheid. 76 Violations occur, of course, but as Professor Henkin
pointed out, no state claims that torture is legal. 7 If jus cogens is
in fact violated, the international community may impose sanctions
on the offending state, as it did most notably in the case of South
7
Africa. 1

deemed necessary. Subsequent to ratification, any proposals for new legislation falling within the area covered by the Covenant must likewise be
submitted to a corresponding review before their adoption as law in order
to guarantee compatibility.
Report on the Second Session, U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 2d Sess., at 26, U.N. Doc. E/1988/14, E/C.12/1988/4.
74. In response to the Chinese government's attack on demonstrating students
in Tiananmen Square, for example, President Bush expressed "deep regret," and
Japanese Prime Minister Sousuke Uno said he was "praying for a return to calm."
World Leaders React to Bloodshed in China, JAPAN ECONOMIC NEwswIRn, June 4,
1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, JEN File; see also Ted Morello, Chinese
Still Welcome to Join UN Peacekeepers, THE

CHRISTIAN

SCI. MoITrroR, June 21,

1989, at 4; cf. Canada Announces Measures to Protest at Chinese Crackdown,
REUTER LiE. REP., June 30, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, LBYRPT File
(Canada to withdraw support for three projects worth 9.1 million dollars, and also
to withdraw its ambassador in Peking, but not to cut off all diplomatic and business
ties "for fear of isolating China in the international community").
75. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 334 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. k, Reporter's note 6 (1987); Anthony
D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens!, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990).
76. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law,
in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3, 15-17 (Hurst Hannum ed.,
1984).
77. HENKIN, supra note 53, at 21.
78. S.C. Res. 418, U.N. SCOR, 32d Sess., Resolutions and Decisions of
1977, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/33 (1978). See also Douglas G. Anglin, United Nations
Economic Sanctions Against South Africa and Rhodesia, in THE UTMIrrY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 23, 34-38 (David Leyton-Brown ed., 1987).
Victims may also seek relief in the domestic courts of other states willing to
assert jurisdiction. E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)(United
States court has jurisdiction over wrongful death action brought under Alien Tort
Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988), for torture in Paraguay of plaintiffs' son); see
also Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991)(United States court
could properly assert jurisdiction under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990), where engineer, recruited and hired
in United States for hospital job in Saudi Arabia, was tortured by government
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Consensus with respect to other human rights is problematic. 79

The process of acceding to the international covenants represents
some agreement, but there is an ongoing debate as to whether it is
enough.80 The Optional Protocol, 8 ' which establishes an international
enforcement regime, and various regional regimes, 2 which promote
enforcement on the regional level, define smaller transnational communities which accept and enforce shared norms. Still, these have

generated relatively scant precedent.83 States remain reluctant to
participate in regimes that allow other states to judge them. The

agents for reporting safety violations), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2937 (1992). See

generally Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789:
A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461 (1989).
79. See generally Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert
Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1861 (1987) (arguing that law is "a communal language"
and urging that it be interpreted in "social contexts in which norms can be generated
and given meaning"); Howard Tolley, Jr., Popular Sovereignty and International
Law: ICJ Strategies for Human Rights Standard Setting, 11 HUM. RTS. Q. 561
(1989).
80. As Professor Sohn noted,
[O]n one hand, acceptance of the lowest possible common denominator
would assure rapid ratification, but the documents would have no real
effect; on the other hand, strict adherence to high ideals might lead states
to refuse to ratify the documents, and the instruments would thus be of
little value.
Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 39 (1982). See generally Ranee K.L.
Panjabi, Describing and Implementing Universal Human Rights, 26 TEx. INT'L. L.J.
189 (1991)(reviewing JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTs IN THEORY AND
(1989)).

PRACTICE

81. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976).
82. E.g., Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948,
2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Feb. 27, 1967, 2 U.S.T. 607 and Dec.
5, 1985, 25 I.L.M. 529. See generally JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HuMAN RIGHTS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1989); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100
YALE L.J. 909 (1991)(discussing the evolution of the United States tradition of
predicating constitutional rights on "membership" in the domestic polity and alter-

natives to that tradition in an international context).
83. See, e.g., 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY
IssuEs 247-53 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984); Francesco Capotorti, Human Rights: The
Hard Road Towards Universality, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 986 (Ronald St. John MacDonald & Douglas
M. Johnston eds., 1983). See generally Philip Alston, The InternationalCovenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in MANUAL ON HuMAN RIGHTS REPORTING

39, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/91/I, U.N. Sales No. E.91.XIV.I (1991); Philip Alston,
The Purposes of Reporting, in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTs REPORTING, supra, at
13; John P. Humphrey, The Implementation of InternationalHuman Rights Law,
24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 31 (1978); Fausto Pocar & Cecil Bernard, National Reports:
Their Submission to Expert Bodies and Follow-Up, in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REPORTING, supra, at 25.
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United States, for example, has been wary of being held to a more
rigorous standard than less affluent countries.84
Because a state has no obligation to provide aid to another,
bilateral aid can and has been conditioned on respect for certain
human rights by the recipient state. 5 Similarly, because a state has
no obligation to trade with another state, it can certainly refrain
from doing so on human rights grounds. Once trade has been entered
into, however, a state is not free to terminate the relationship because
of subsequent human rights violations, however repugnant, of its
trading partner. Violating the human rights of its own people does
not justify countermeasures. Even humanitarian intervention-even
after the Kurds8M6remains highly sensitive.87 Those denied their human rights depend primarily on the domestic legal system of the
denying
for their vindication."8 In some countries there is a
"culture state
of compliance"
and respect for the rule of law.89 In states
where human rights protections are most needed, however, there
usually is not.9

84. See Thomas M. Franck, Of Gnats and Camels: Is There a Double
Standard at the United Nations?, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 811, 819-25 (1984).
85. E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 262d(d) (Supp. I 1989)(United States to seek to channel
economic assistance to governments respecting human rights); see also Canada
Announces Measures to Protest at Chinese Crackdown, supra note 74 (Canada
cancels 9.1 million dollars in aid to China following Tiananmen Square debacle).
86. See Tom J. Farer, Human Rights and Foreign Policy: What the Kurds
Learned (A Drama in One Act), 14 HuM. RTS. Q. 62 (1992).
87. As Professor O'Connell pointed out, however, "Distribution of humanitarian aid, even against the wishes of a government in effective control, is not
unlawful intervention according to the International Court of Justice." O'Connell,
supra note 30, at 906.
International law still rejects the use of force for humanitarian intervention by
a state (except perhaps to save the lives of hostages, as the Israelis did at Entebbe).
Henkin, supra note 8, at 151-52. "A different question is the permissibility of
collective humanitarian intervention on the authority of the U.N. or of a regional
body such as the [Organization of American States]." Id.
88. See Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REv.
405 (1979); accord Bilder, supra note 76, at 13 ("Once again, the easiest and most
effective way to implement human rights is through action within each nation's own
legal system.").
89. Great Britain, for example, has a well-established tradition of deference
to the rule of law. Louis HENKIN, THn RiGHTs OF MAN TODAY 51 (1978). See
generally R.R.

FENNESSEY,

BURKE,

PAINE, AND

THE RIGHTS OF MAN

213-50

(1963)(describing schism in eighteenth century British liberal thought over the amount
of deference due human rights considerations). However, even such states may have
blind spots or lapses, as shown, for instance, by Britain's record with respect to
Northern Ireland. See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A)(1978)(Judgment of Jan. 18), reprinted in MARK W. JANIS & RIcHARD S. KAY,
EUROPEAN HuMAN RIGHTS LAW 117-32 (1990). See generally Symposium on Human
Rights in the U.S., 135 PROC. AM. P~mosopmcAxL Soc'Y 1 (1991).
90. Jimmy Carter, The Rule of Law and the State of Human Rights, 4
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 3 (1991) (describing "too many countries [where] the final
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Even if the domestic state endeavors to provide a remedy for a
human rights violation, the victim is confronted with the second
caveat: the human rights norm at issue is interpreted and enforced
under domestic law. 9' Adherence to the Political Covenant represents
a continuum of commitment to its principles. States differ, not only
in the degree of deference they give international law, 92 but in how
they interpret the covenant's provisions as applied in their respective
domestic contexts. 93 While giving lip service to civil and political
rights, for example, the Soviet form of these rights was virtually
unrecognizable to a Western viewer. 94 Under the former Soviet constitution, civil and political rights were conceived of less as "negative
rights," constraining the state, than as positive rights, granted (and
determined) by the state itself. The people's "right to free association," for instance, consisted of an affirmative right to assemble in
specific public buildings designated by the state. 95 While domestic
construction of norms may accommodate legitimate concerns of
cultural relativism, 96 human "dignity and worth" may become a
decisions are made by the government itself, depending on transient circumstances .... No higher law constrains the state."). See generally Robert F. Drinan
& Teresa T. Kuo, The 1991 Battle for Human Rights in China, 14 HUM. RTS. Q.
21 (1992).
91. See STANDING COMM. ON WORLD ORDER UNDER LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N,
INVOKING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 16-18 (1985)
(considering how international human rights law could "infuse" domestic standards);
Richard B. Bilder, Integrating International Human Rights Law into Domestic LawU.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981).

92.

See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A

Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REv. 853 (1987)
(treaties should not be subordinated to subsequent statutes). But see Peter Westen,

The Place of Foreign Treaties in the Courts of the United States: A Reply to Louis
Henkin, 101 HARv. L. REV. 511, 512 (1987)(lawful treaties are "lexically superior
to statutes and ... binding on the political branches of government").
93. As Henkin suggested, at the very least adherence represents an acknowledgement that we live in an "age of rights," an age in which rights have acquired
universal cachet. HENKIN, supra note 53, at ix-x. But see Henry J. Steiner, The
Youth of Rights, 104 HARv. L. REV. 917 (1990)(reviewing HENKIN, supra note 53).

See generally John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A

Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J.INT'L L. 310, 313 (1992)(discussing "status of treaties in
national legal systems, that is, the question of 'direct application'; and the hierarchical status in national legal systems when directly applied treaty norms clash with
other norms of the same system").
94. The Soviet Union was a party to the Civil Covenant. HENKIN ET AL.,
BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 388

(2d ed. 1987). For a scholarly comparison of the Soviet and American approaches
to domestic implementation of human rights norms, see Damrosch, supra note 6.
95. Konstitusiia SSSR [Constitution] art. 50 (U.S.S.R.)(1977). See Damrosch,
supra note 6, at 2330 & n.77 ("International human rights law resists the tendency
of Soviet constitutional law to place the interests of the state above the rights of
individuals.")
96. See generally RELATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION, supra
note 14; Donnelly, supra note 14; Renteln, supra note 14.
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variable and even indeterminable standard, depending on one's location and the current political situation in that state.
Implementation of economic rights is even more problematic.
The major mechanism for assuring compliance, aside from domestic
law, is the preparation and submission of self-monitoring reports to
the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Committee).9 The Committee meets with state representatives
after its review of the reports. During this meeting, which is open
to the public, the Committee typically asks for further information
or clarification" and concludes with comments" intended to enable
the state to better achieve its own objectives."0° A similar self-

97. As Professor Alston noted, "The principal obligation of States parties
to the [Economic] Covenant is to implement its provisions at the national level. The
obligation to report to an international body ...

is essentially a means of promoting

the implementation of that obligation." Alston, supra note 83, at 39. The Committee
also uses the reporting process "to demonstrate a consistency of approach from one
report to another." Id. at 40. This procedure has not always been effective. See
Forsythe, supra note 69, at 541 (East Europeans resisted Committee review prior to
collapse of Soviet bloc); accord REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATONAL LAW 18990 (1986). See generally Alston, supra note 83, at 13-16, 39-77; Humphrey, supra
note 83, at 37-38.
Article 16 of the Economic Covenant requires the parties to submit "reports
on the measures which they have adopted and the progress made" to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. Economic Covenant, supra note 55, art. 16, paras.
1-2. The Secretary-General originally transmitted copies of the reports to the United
Nations Economic and Social Council, but they are now submitted directly to the
Committee. For a full account of the reasons for the change, and its consequences,
see Philip Alston & Bruno Simma, Second Session of the UN Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 603 (1988); see also
MOWER, supra note 69, at 31-46. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that
the formation of an independent monitoring organ represented both an acknowledgement of the inadequacy of the original system and a renewed commitment to
economic rights on the part of the United Nations.
98. Countries are accordingly encouraged to send knowledgeable experts to
these meetings. Interview with Alexandre Tikhonov, Secretary to the Committee,
United Nations Centre for Human Rights, Palais des Nations, in Geneva, Switz.
(June 11, 1991).

99. Pocar & Bernard, supra note 83, at 25, 26.
100. The Committee indicates when a report, or the activity reported, fails to
satisfy ICESCR. Interview with Alexandre Tikhonov, supra note 98; see also Alfred
de Zayas, The Potential for the United States Joining the Covenant Family, 20 GA.
J. INT'L & Comp. L. 299, 304 (1990)("[Dliscussions have been serious, well-focused,
and non-political ....

[Tihe Committee has encouraged but not pressured states

parties."). For an example of relatively vigorous questioning, see Report on the
Third Session, U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 3d Sess.,
at 34, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22, E/C.12/1989/5 (France questioned about right to
housing).
The Committee also prepares "general comments," which are not limited to
specific countries. "The Committee endeavors, through its general comments, to
make the experience gained so far through the examination of these reports available
for the benefit of all States parties in order to assist and promote their further
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monitoring regime has been proposed in connection with international
environmental rights.' 0 '

III.

ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS

A.

Impetus for Acceptance

Environmental rights are rooted in both our real fears of collective
annihilation and the growing international recognition of the dignity
and worth of the individual human being. 1 02 Like peace, environmental rights have emerged from the common realization that our
survival as a species, as well as the survival of the other species with
whom we share this planet, requires their recognition and rigorous
enforcement. 0 3 Indeed, it may be argued that the threat of annihiimplementation of the [Economic] Covenant." Id. Annex III, at 87.
While this illustrates the deference accorded a sovereign state under international
enforcement procedures, it should be kept in mind: "As is not the case with civilpolitical rights, . . . another state can help give effect to some economic-social rights
...without forcible intervention, merely by financial aid to the local government."
HENKiN, supra note 53, at 45. But see Lloyd N. Cutler, The Internationalizationof
Human Rights, 1990 U. Ill. L. Rev. 575, 588 ("economic rights are especially
unsuitable for international protection by one state against another or by the
international community as a whole").
101. See Oscar Schachter, The Emergence of InternationalEnvironmentalLaw,
44 J. INT'L Ass. 457 (1991). "[I]n what many said would be the true significance
of [the Earth Charter], machinery would be set up to constantly assess the danger
of climate change and to take further action, if necessary." William K. Stevens, 43
Lands Adopt Treaty to Cut Emissions of Gases, N.Y. TIMEs, May 10, 1992, § 1,
at 14.
102. For a cogent introduction, see Richard B. Bilder, The Settlement of
Disputes in the Field of the InternationalLaw of the Environment, 144 REcuEB.
DES COURS 139, 145-50 (1975). For astute assessments of the existing regimes, see
Palmer, supra note 16; Catherine Tinker, Environmental Planet Management by the
United Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come?, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 793 (1990). For a comprehensive overview, see Developments in the Law,
InternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HAuv. L. REV. 1484 (1991). For an author-

itative analysis, see Schachter, supra note 101. See generally FACTSHEET:

THE UnrrED

NATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIONMENT (United Nations Ass'n of the United States
of America, New York, N.Y.).
About 140 multilateral treaties on environmental issues had been concluded as
of 1990. Schachter, supra note 101, at 470. For a succinct description of some of
the major international treaties, resolutions, and declarations, see A.O. Adede, A
Profile of Legal Instrumentsfor InternationalResponses to Problems of Environment
and Development, 21 EvTL.PoL'Y & L. 224 (1991).
103. At GoRE, EARTH IN TE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HumAN Spmrr
(1991)(civilization cannot survive unless saving the environment becomes its organizing principle); Catherine Tinker, Environmental Damage and the United Nations
Security Council: Towards a Broad Definition of Threats to InternationalPeace and
Security and the Need for Collective Security, 59 TENN. L. REv. 787 (1992); cf.
William K. Stevens, Lessons of Rio: A New Prominence and an Effective Blandness,
N.Y. TnIEs, June 14, 1992, § 1, at 10. (noting "new-found prominence of the
environment as an international issue, bidding to rank with economics and national
security").
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lation from continuing violations of environmental rights is less of
a risk and more of a certainty than nuclear war ever was.
It may also be more urgent.'0 A major part of the nuclear horror
was the potential for catastrophe without time to prepare, to warn,
or to avoid. Advocates of disarmament emphasized the risk of instant
holocaust, even instant holocaust by mistake. 0 5 The Cuban missile
crisis was probably the closest we came-surely close enough, but in
fact it was avoided. °6
Environmental apocalypse is qualitatively distinguishable. Even if
absolute catastrophe may be averted,107 even if policies and practices
which lead to it are abandoned, we have a long way to go to
recovery. 108 We must cope with massive clean-ups and remote, often
unforeseen, consequences. Reclamation may not only be dauntingly
complex and expensive, but impossible.) 9 While environmental destruction may be even more pressing than the threat of war, it may
well be less susceptible to diplomatic resolution or deterrence. Private
actors, for example, are likely to be less easily controlled by the state
than its own personnel.
Equally important, the international commitment to environmental rights is compelled by the same considerations of "human worth

104. The threat posed by humans to the global environment may well be the
major danger in the post-Cold War world. See GORE, supra note 103, at 34-35. The
Bush Administration's lack of a coherent environmental policy "raise[s] questions
about the United States role in a world in which national security may be as affected
by global environmental threats as by military ones." Keith Schneider, Environmental
Policy: It's a Jungle in There, N.Y. TIMEs, June 7, 1992, § 4, at 1.
105. See, e.g., EUGENE BURDICK, FAI-SAFE (1962). As Anthony D'Amato
remarked, "Acts of cosmic stupidity are always possible . . .. " Anthony D'Amato,

Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment?,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 190, 190 n.6 (1990).
106.

See generally ABRAM CHAYES, TIlE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS (1974); Brunson

MacChesney, Some Comments on the "Quarantine" of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.
592 (1963); Quincy Wright, The Cuban Quarantine,57 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1963).
107. It has been suggested, for example, that space may serve as a "safetyvalve"-that within "perhaps two human lifetimes, it will be possible to move most
polluting industries off the Earth and into space. And the industries that remain
can be made far less polluting through the use of clean, inexpensive energy derived

from space."

OUTER SPACE

AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT:

A

NSS POSITION PAPER

4-5 (Nat'l Space Soc'y, Washington, D.C.). For a concise overview of environmental
concerns in outer space, see GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER
SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 195-98 (1989).

As Professor Schachter pointed out, extension of the concept of environmental
harm to outer space presents as yet unresolved issues of policy. Schachter, supra
note 101, at 465-66.
108. Douglas R. Weiner, Chernobyl Isn't the Whole Story, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 1992, § 7, at 14 (describing "full recovery" for the Soviet Union as an "unimaginably expensive prospect").
109. Schachter, supra note 101, at 472-73 (discussing the irreversibility of
global warming).
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and dignity" that mandate compliance with other human rights
norms. As the environment deteriorates, there is a growing acknowledgement that health as well as the use and enjoyment of natural
resources are as crucial to the realization of human dignity as first
and second generation human rights." 0 Environmental rights, moreover, meet the United Nations General Assembly guidelines for states
and United Nations bodies articulating new rights. These rights are
"consistent with . .. existing . . . international human rights . . . of

fundamental character and derive from the inherent dignity and worth
of the human person ... sufficiently precise ... provide . . . realistic
and effective implementation . . . [and] . . . [a]ttract broad international support.""' Indeed, Stephen Marks has described environmental rights as
the most "classical" case of a set of claims which have been given
holistic formulation in terms of human rights. All the features of
a right of the new generation are there: elaboration of a specialized
body of law, an easily identifiable international legislative process,
systems,
incorporation of the right as human right within municipal
2
and need for concerted efforts of all social actors."
B.

Concessions to State Sovereignty"'

Unlike the leeway given states in connection with intrastate use
of force and the dearth of interstate enforcement of human rights,

110. For an early appreciation, see Charles Maechling, The Emergent Right
to a Decent Environment, 1 HuM. RTS. 59 (1970). The first important intergovernmental mdeting to address the need for an international response to environmental
degradation was held in Stockholm in 1972. Declaration of the U.N. Conference on
the Human Environment in Stockholm, June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972), U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1. (1974) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]; see also
Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, 14 HARV.
J. INT'L L. 423 (1973). See generally W. PAUL GORMLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 121-45 (1976) (describing United Nations "experiments" to formulate a functional program).
This refers to future as well as present health, use, and enjoyment. See EDITH
BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON
PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 1-3 (1989); RESPONSBILITIES TO FUTURE
GENERATIONS (E. Partridge ed., 1981); Agora, What Obligation Does Our Generation

Owe to the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility, 84 AM. J.
INT'L

L. 190 (1990). See generally THE

FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE

(Rend-Jean Dupuy ed., 1984).
111. Setting International Standards in the Field of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
120, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 178, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1987).
112. Marks, supra note 12, at 442-43.
113. For a cogent description of approaches to the "sovereignty problem" in
ENVIRONMENT

this context, i.e., obtaining the assent and assuring the compliance of sovereign
states, see Developments in the Law, supra note 102, at 1552-66.
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there are no accepted structural exceptions to international environmental rights." 4 The states of the Southern Hemisphere argue that
allowances must be made in order to permit them to develop and
provide their people with a standard of living more like that of the
already industrialized North.' The well-established law against transboundary pollution," 6 in conjunction with the already alarming contamination of the global environment, has made the Northern states
unreceptive to these arguments, especially in view of their own
decreasing reliance on heavy industry and their comfortable economic
hegemony. "'

114. Sovereignty concerns are typically framed in terms of "States' sovereign
rights over their own natural resources." Stockholm Declaration, supra note 110,
principle 21; accord Developing Countries and International Environmental Law, 21
ENvm. POL'Y & L. 213 (1991)(formulation adopted at symposium sponsored by
Chinese Government). The implications of sovereignty in this context may have
grave consequences. See, e.g., Daniel B. Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The
International Law Commission's Study of "International Liability, " 80 Am.J. INT'L
L. 305, 325 (1986)(importation of hazardous waste as a sovereign prerogative of a
developing state); Jeffery D. Williams, Comment, Trashing Developing Nations: The
Global Hazardous Waste Trade, 39 BuFF. L. Rv. 275 (1991); Symposium, The
Bhopal Tragedy: Social and Legal Issues, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 269 (1985); cf. OscAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 383 (1991)("[L]inkage
between international and domestic law is crucial for environmental protection.").
115. See, e.g., Ved P. Nanda, International Environmental Protection and
Developing Countries' Interests: The Role of International Law, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J.
497 (1991)(reviewing developing countries' perspectives on the export of hazardous
wastes and pesticides and protection of the ozone layer); Symposium, International
Development Agencies (IDAs), Human Rights and Environmental Considerations,
17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 29 (1988).
Even on the national level, consensus is often difficult to achieve. See, e.g.,
David M. Driesen, The Congressional Role in International Environmental Law and
Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 287
(1991).

116. Trail Smeltor Case (U.S. v. Can.), III R.I.A.A. 1905 (U.N. Arbitral
Trib. 1949); Stockholm Declaration, supra note 110, principle 21; see also Corfu
Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (April 9) (holding that every state
has an obligation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States" -Albania's failure to warn a British ship of mines in
the Corfu Channel was accordingly a violation of international law). See generally
Magraw, supra note 114.
117. I am not suggesting that the "Northern states" have agreed upon a
consistent approach. See Steven Keeva, Environmental Law Takes Root, 78 A.B.A.
J., May 1992, at 52, 54. For a description of the process through which consensus
is sought among the members of the European Community, see Michael S. Feeley
& Peter M. Gilhuly, Green Law-Making: A Primer on the European Community's
Environmental Legislative Process, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653 (1991). See
generally, David A. Westbrook, Environmental Policy in the European Community:
Observations on the European Environment Agency, 15 HARv. ENvTL. L. Rnv. 257
(1991); G. Nelson Smith, III, A Comparative Analysis of European and American
Environmental Laws: Their Effects on International Blue Chip Corporate Mergers
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The draft Earth Charter,"' prepared for the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)," 9 held in
June 1992, reflects some important rhetorical compromises. 20 Principle 3, for example, provides that "[T]he right to development must
be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental
needs of present and future generations.' ' 21 Principle 4, similarly,
concedes both the need for "sustainable development" and the need
for "environmental protection" within the framework of any such
development: "In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the ' development
process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.' 22
As Professor Edith Brown Weiss recently observed, 23 the major
issue for UNCED is how these interests may be addressed in the
context of an effective international regime. 24 While there may be

and Acquisitions, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 573 (1991).
Neither the "North" nor the "South" is monolithic. William K. Stevens, Rio:
A Start on Managing What's Left of This Place, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1992, § 4,
at 1. The United States, like some "Southern" states, rejected measures that it
feared would adversely affect economic growth. For example, the Bush administration feared the biodiversity treaty would damage the biotechnology industry. Steven
Greenhouse, Ecology, the Economy and Bush, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, § 4, at
1.

118. Declaration of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development
in Rio de Janeiro, April 4, 1992 (draft) [hereinafter Draft Rio Declaration] reprinted
in Draft of Environmental Rules: "Global Partnership," N.Y. TrMEs, April 5, 1992,
§ 1, at 10.
119. See G.A. Res. 228, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 151, U.N.
Doc. A/44/49 (1990). Exhaustive planning for UNCED included three meetings of
the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom I, II, and III). See PrepCom: Third Meeting,
21 EN TL. L. & POL'Y 186 (1991). During these meetings the broad structure for
UNCED was endorsed. This structure consists of three elements: a statement of
principles (the Earth Charter), an agenda for action in the 21st century (Agenda
21), and global treaties, including treaties on climate change and biodiversity. Id.
For a useful overview of UNCED in nontechnical terms, see Bruce Babbitt,
The World After Rio, WORLD MONITOR, June 1992, at 28.
120. But see Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARv. INT'L
L.J. 397, 403 (1991).

The official ideology of [UNCED] compels diplomats to speak of environmental and developmental goals as if there were no essential conflict between
them, by defining one in terms of the other. Poverty is pollution; environmental quality is an aspect of the standard of living. Such harmony is soon
dispelled when concrete action is debated.
Id.
121.
122.
123.

Draft Rio Declaration, supra note 118, principle 3.
Id. principle 4.
Edith Brown Weiss, Remarks at the American Society of International

Law Annual Meeting (January 3, 1992).
124. The normative authority of UNCED is an open question. See THOMAS
M. FRANCK, TiM POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 16 (1990) (describing how
"a rule or rule-making institution . . . itself exerts a pull towards compliance on
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some room for accommodating different local conditions, needs, and
standards, it is doubtful that variation on the scale tolerated under
other human rights treaties could be accepted in the context of
environmental rights. 25 The argument can be made that such variation should not be tolerated in any context-that this amounts to
the derogation of purportedly agreed-upon norms and the ultimate
subversion of the protective regime. It has been suggested that the
Women's Convention (CEDAW), 126 for example, is so riddled with
reservations and understandings 27 that the international regime itself
is debased. 2 ' The extent of such debasement is unclear, however, in

those addressed normatively"); Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Building the International Environmental Regime: A Status Report, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
679 (1990)(giving an overview of key international environmental problems and
assessing the international response to those problems); see also Roberta Dohse,
Comment, Global Air Pollution and the Greenhouse Effect: Can International Legal
Structures Meet the Challenge?, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 179 (1990)(global air pollution
and the greenhouse effect); Ved P. Nanda, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: A
Challenge for International Environmental Law and Policy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L. L.
482 (1989)(analyzing the possibilities and limitations of the international regime for
the protection of the ozone layer). For a detailed account of the first globalinternational (as opposed to regional-interstate) treaty for environmental protection,
see Varr

KOESTER, THE RAMSA

CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF WETLANDS

(1989). See generally Myron L. Scott, Two Models for Environmental Cooperation,
KOESTER, supra, and PETER M. HAAS, SAVING
THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

22 ENVTL. L. 349 (1992)(reviewing

(1990)).
125. See, e.g., Michael B. Saunders, Comment, Valuation and International
Regulation of Forest Ecosystems: Prospects for a Global Forest Agreement, 66
WASH. L. REv. 871, 891 (1991)("Previous agreements designed to protect global
resources located within national borders have proven to be of limited effectiveness.
States perceive conflicts between economic interests and conservation and fail to
undertake measures that they believe are incompatible with national sovereignty.").
126. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
127. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 76, arts. 19,
31 (formulation of reservations and interpretation of treaties). See generally Belilos
Case, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 21-24 (1988); D.W. Bowett, Reservations to
Non-Restricted Multilateral Treaties, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 67 (1976-1977).
128. See Belinda Clark, The Vienna Convention Reservations Regime and the
Convention on Discrimination Against Women, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 281 (1991);
Rebecca J. Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L. L. 643 (1990). States' often
haphazard observance of CEDAW exacerbates this debasement. International consensus on gender discrimination is notably problematic. For a comprehensive and
perceptive discussion, see Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991). But see Arthur Rovine & Jack
Goldklang, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understandings, in U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RiGHTs TREATIES: WITH OR WTHouT RESERVATIONS?
54 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981); Reservations to the Convention on Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). See generally
Rebecca J. Cook, International Human Rights Law Concerning Women: Case Notes
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part because its perception is so contingent upon cultural factors. As
a corollary, there is no agreed-upon method of precisely measuring
derogation.
Environmental degradation, in contrast, is often demonstrably
uncontainable, 29 and the spread of pollution may be ascertained with
relative precision. 3 0 For this same reason, interstate tolerance of
violations, deplored but characteristic of first and second generation
human rights, is not feasible in the environmental context, at least
not to the extent hitherto condoned with respect to other human
rights. As Sir Geoffrey Palmer warned, "The stakes are so high that
slippage in meeting the standards will be intolerable. The actions of
one nation could render nugatory the actions of all the others to
preserve the global environment."''
At the same time, however,
states for the most part remain as reluctant to submit to the judgment
32
of other states as they are when human rights violations are claimed.
Environmental rights are predicated on both the concern for our
collective survival underlying the commitment to international peace

and Comments, 23 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L. L. 779 (1990). For a cogent analysis of
this problem in the political rights context, see Oscar Schachter, The Obligation of
the Parties to Give Effect to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 73 AM. J.
INT'L L. 462 (1979).

129. It has become "axiomatic that these problems transcend the capacity of
any nation to handle or avoid." Bilder, supra note 102, at 146 (quoting Maurice
F. Strong, One Year After Stockholm, 51 FOREIGN Ar. 690, 697 (1973)); accord,
FACTSHEET: TIE UNITED NATIONS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 102,

at 4 (quoting Carl Sagan, Remarks at the Global Forum on Environment and
Development in Moscow (Jan. 15-19, 1990)) ("Intrinsically, [these assaults on the
environment) are transnational, transgenerational, and trans-ideological. So are all
conceivable solutions."). See generally Robert A. Kaplan, Into the Abyss: International Regulation of Subseabed Nuclear Waste Disposal, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 769
(1991).

This does not mean, of course, that there are always "significant or substantial"
harmful effects, which will necessarily cross national boundaries. Schachter, supra
note 101, at 463-65. Thus, not all "degradation" would be cognizable under existing
international regimes. Id.
130. At the same time, the significant difficulties confronting environmentalists
should not be underestimated. Monitoring is not simple, and in too many substantive
(as well as geographic) areas it is not being done at all. Palmer, supra note 14, at

263. What are the standards and what is the process for determining them? What
are acceptable deviations? Who has the responsibility and who has the authority to
decide these questions? See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 101 (describing unsuccessful
efforts to "establish clear targets and timetables on emissions"). These are not
abstract problems, but ever-present dilemmas in negotiation. For a discussion of
possible legal approaches to the problem of setting specific standards, see Schachter,
supra note 101, at 467.
131.

Palmer, supra note 16, at 282.

132.

See, e.g., supra notes 14, 33, 75. The idea of international "green

policing," for example, which is central to the plan of the European Environment

Agency, has been criticized for interfering with member state sovereignty. Westbrook,
supra note 117, at 263-64.

"THE REMAINS OF THE DA Y"

1992]

and the concern for individual dignity and worth underlying international human rights. Because environmental rights require compatible intrastate and interstate standards and compliance mechanisms,
however, they place unprecedented demands on the state system.
CONCLUSION

In his brilliant novel, The Remains of the Day,'" Kazuo Ishiguro
describes an automobile trip taken by an aging butler through the
English countryside.' 3 4 Inspired by the natural beauty around him,
the butler finds himself reviewing his life, particularly the years
between the world wars. As he wanders through the tranquil landscape he thinks about the failure of the world leaders to avert the
second world war and his own unquestioning support of what he
now realizes were their misguided efforts. At the end of his journey,
he sits at dusk by the ocean with tears streaming down his face.'"
A stranger tries to comfort him: "The evening's the best part of the
day. You've done your day's work. Now you can put your feet up

and enjoy

' ' 36

it. 1

But Ishiguro's hero has spent a lifetime serving in what he refers
to without irony as one of the "big houses,"' 3 7 passively accepting
rules, hierarchies, and boundaries that not only kept him from
exploring the natural world but from meaningful human contact as
well. He has had a belated glimpse of a harmonious natural world
and his place in it, a clear view of what he has already lost, but he
seems more likely to suffer than to learn from his vision.
We, too, have glimpsed an integrated vision of a harmonious
natural world and our place in it.38 We have to ask whether a system
of sovereign states can support such a vision.' 39 The state system has

133.

KAZUo IsHIGuRo, THE REMAiNs OF THE DAY (1989).
134. Id.
135. Id.at 240-45.
136. Id. at 243-44.
137. Id. at 241.
138. I am not suggesting that we have all had such a vision personally. But
even if we have not-and even if we have not read Lester R. Brown, Rachel Carson,
Annie Dillard, Christopher Stone, Edith Brown Weiss, or the Club of Rome's
publications-we have followed the Earth Summit in the news, seen the Sierra Club
calendar, "saved the whales," bought "dolphin-safe" tuna, recycled newspapers
and aluminum cans, participated in Earth Day, or sat through FERN GULLY (Twentieth Century Fox 1992) or Captain Planet (ABC television broadcast, Saturday
mornings). Environmental consciousness has become part of our zeitgeist.
139. [W]e must reassess our unquestioned respect for national sovereignty
and our faith in the capacity of the nation-state to respond fully to the
challenges we face. There are two areas ... where I think this reality
strikes hardest. One is human rights and the second is the protection of
the environment.
Mondale, supra note 17, at 450.
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shown that it can recognize and endorse universal values, but not
without major structural concessions to state sovereignty.
Even if such concessions are acceptable in the contexts of peace
and human rights, they are unendurable in the context of environmental rights. We see, in our dead rivers' 40 and dying forests,14 ' in
the encroaching deserts of sub-Saharan Africa, 4 2 in the putrid stench
of East European cities, 43 what we have lost.'" We see the limitations
that inhere in a sovereign system. While these limitations permit a
pinched success in the peace and human rights regimes, they tolerate
and perpetuate normative conflicts between intrastate and interstate
regimes fatal to any meaningful conception of environmental rights.
Are we capable of the transformative act of imagination necessary
to articulate that conception? 41 Do we have the political will to
realize it?' Unless both questions can be answered affirmatively-

140. See, e.g., Ray Moseley, E. Germans Fear Ecological Crisis, Cm. TRI.,
Feb. 4, 1990, § 1, at 23. (noting that the Elbe, "Europe's most polluted river,"
carries about 27 tons of mercury a year); Matt Neufeld, Pols on the River Push
for Cleaner Anacostia Tide, WASH. TIEs, Aug. 28, 1990, at B4 (describing the
"most polluted river on Chesapeake Bay").
141. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Satellite View: Forest Damage, North and
South, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, § 4, at 6 (photos of forests from space show
nearly 90 percent of the original Northwest forest is gone); Saunders, supra note
125.
142. Bruce Finley, Desertification:Africans Losing Battle Against the Sahara,
SAN FRANcisco CHRON., Apr. 20, 1992, at A10; Mark Huband, Desert Creeps Up
on Northern Nigeria, THE GAzETrE (Montreal), June 2, 1992, at A14.
143. See, e.g., MuRRAY FESHBACH & ALFRED FRiENDLY, JR., EcocmE IN THE
U.S.S.R.: HEALTH AND NATURE UNDER SIEGE (1992); Weiner, supra note 108.
144. See generally CLIVE PONTING, A GREEN HISTORY OF TiE WORLD: THE
ENVIRONMENT AND THE COLLAPSE OF GREAT CIVILIzATIoNs (1992).

145.

"[Mlethods and techniques now available to fashion new instruments of

international law to cope with global environmental problems cannot meet [the]

challenge." Palmer, supra note 16, at 264; accord Hermann Scheer, Earth Summit
in Rio: Will It Do More Harm than Good?, THE NATION, Apr. 20, 1992, at 522,
523 ("At best [Rio will produce] nonmandatory, ineffective guidelines. The international political system is not capable of more-not now and not in the near
future.").

146. Governor Babbitt correctly predicted a "three-part North-South bargain,"
consisting of a Northern commitment to stabilize, and then reduce, carbon dioxide
emissions, and in exchange for some kind of Northern support for sustainable
development in the South, Southern acceptance of a biodiversity treaty to stop the
destruction of the rain forests and the extinction of plants and animals that live
there. Babbitt, supra note 119, at 30.
Perhaps if we can rethink the limitations of the state system as opportunities
for nonstate participation, including participation by international organizations and
even individuals, we can begin to create a sustainable future. See Janis, supra note
10, at 363 (noting the "obvious importance of non-state actors in international
politics"); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 102, at 1600-04 (urging
broadened participation in the decision-making process). For a specific and creative

example, see David A. Wirth, Legitimacy, Accountability, and Partnership:A Model
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and soon-we, too, are likely to spend "the remains of the day" in
futile regret.
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for Advocacy on Third World Environmental Issues, 100 YALE L.J. 2645 (1991).
For a description of the ways in which scientists and conservationists may play a
more significant role than states in shaping the law, see PETER M. HAAS, SAVING
THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION

(1990), and Thorme, supra note 15, at 305-08 (Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund,
along with Friends of the Earth, brought two environmental cases before the United
Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities). Finally, of course, there is the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement.
Under the slogan, "The Answer to All Our Problems," the movement points out
that "the extinction of Homo Sapiens would mean survival for millions, if not
billions, of other Earth-dwelling species." Theodore Roszak, Green Guilt and
Ecological Overload, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1992, at A27.
See, e.g., DONELLA H. MEADOWS ET AL., BEYOND THE LIMTs: CONFRONTING
GLOBAL COLLAPSE, ENVISIONING A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (1992)(computer model-based
argument for sustainability); Lester R. Brown, Environment: World Watcher's
Warning, 5 WORLD MONITOR 18, 20 (May 1992). But see Developments in the Law,
supra note 102, at 1639 (concluding that "the ultimate goal ... must remain the
development and strengthening of each state's own regulatory regime"); accord
Melissa Thorme, Local to Global: Citizen's Legal Rights and Remedies Relating to
Toxic Waste Dumps, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 101, 148-51 (1991)(noting that domestic
options-on the local, state, and federal levels-are more promising options for
dealing with toxic waste dumps than the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, opened for
signature March 22, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. No. 5, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 28 I.L.M.
649 (entered into force May 5, 1992)); cf. Williamson, supra note 124, at 744-50
(making a persuasive case for addressing environmental problems on the "proper
level," i.e., global, regional, bilateral, or national). See generally Richard B. Bilder,
The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Environmental
Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51 (1981).
147. As Albert Schweitzer predicted, "Man has lost the capacity to foresee
and forestall. He will end by destroying the earth." RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING
v (1962)(quoting Albert Schweitzer in dedication). Maybe not. For heartening descriptions of "paradigmatic success stories," see Scott, supra note 124.

